Benas Poderis’ Post

Privatus Lietuvos gynybos finansavimo modelis V1.0. Tokiu pavadinimu adresuotą laišką neseniai išsiunčiau daliai Jūsų.   Jeigu ankščiau kalbėjome apie užsienio investuotojų atsargumą mūsų regionui geopolitiniame kontekste, paskutinius keletą mėnesių matome kitą dar blogesnę tendenciją – neinstitucinis Lietuvos kapitalas (šeimos biurai, pasiturintys asmenys ir kt.), t.y. grupė, buvusi pagrindine Lietuvos investicijų rinkos ir BVP varomąją jėga ilgą laiką, labai aktyviai ieško būdų, kaip išvesti kapitalą iš Lietuvos.   Dėl šios priežasties jau kurį laiką galvojau, kaip rasti būdą, kuris galėtų prisidėti prie Lietuvos gynybos finansavimo, padėtų sulaikyti dalį išeinančio vietinio kapitalo, įkvėptų daugiau pasitikėjimo mūsų šalimi, įtrauktų skirtingas kapitalo grupes nuo institucinio iki neprofesionalaus, idėjinius žmones ir išimtinai pragmatinius, padėtų skatinti ekonomiką išnaudojant tuos įrankius, kuriuos turime ant stalo jau dabar.   Nesu tikras, ar pavyktų tokiu būdu finansuoti 5 B EUR, tačiau dėl 1,5 B esu pakankamai užtikrintas. Savo mintis sudėjau į prisegtą dokumentą (vadinkime jį atviro kodo galimybių studija arba tiesiog koncepcijos prezentacija). Pridėjus Jūsų žinias, kompetenciją ir resursus  – manau galėtume tai įgyvendinti 👊  

Delighted to announce that Nter Private Debt Fund has successfully made its debut investment in Poland, Warsaw! We're pleased to have provided mezzanine/junior financing to Solida Capital for their acquisition of an old office building just west of the Warsaw City Center, close to Jerozolimskie Avenue. We are fans of conversion / modernization projects both from debt and equity side therefore it is really nice that this building will be transformed into efficient, ESG compliant modern office. I am very proud of Donatas, who has lead this process from our fund side. Many thanks for Joao, Gabriela from Solida, Marc, Aleksandra and all the team of Clifford Chance Poland and Allen & Overy Poland involved in the transaction. More info in the link in comments. #nter #nterassetmanagement #nterprivatedebt

Private debt was the only asset class that lacked a conference in the Baltics, therefore - attention attention, we would love to invite you all to a first time event in the Baltics - Baltic Private Debt Forum powered by Nter, together with Verslo žinios, WALLESS and Redgate . The event will take place on 16th of May in Vilnius, Cyber City. It will focus on many angles actual for both private debt investors and companies seeking to fund larger deals. We are very happy that the agenda and the list of speakers are getting better and better every day - all major regionally active private debt managers will be here, institutional investors will also take place. See you there! https://lnkd.in/dip-58nj

Alternatyvaus finansavimo ir privačios skolos rinka išgyvena panašią situaciją, kokią išgyveno NT turto klasė prieš 10 metų. Daug naujų žaidėjų, daug naujų fondų, daug galimybių tiesiogiai investuoti į įvairius aukšto pajamingumo skolos instrumentus. Privati skola arba net tiesiog skola “is the new black” antrus metus iš eilės. Kaip vieni iš šios turto klasės pionierių Lietuvoje, nemažai edukavome rinką, komunikavome apie konkrečius pavydžius, stereotipus, tačiau tuo pačiu neturėjome platformos plačiau ir lėčiau pakalbėti apie pačią turto klasę, profesionalaus kapitalo požiūrį, apžvelgti ką patyrėme savo kailiu per 40+ atliktų investicijų, ir kaip matome ateinančius 2-5 metus. Kam įdomu, šį kartą podcast formate su Donatas, Ugnius ir Verslo žinios plačiau ir nuosekliau: https://lnkd.in/d7ERNxTV #nter #privatedebt #nterprivatedebt

Justas Šaltinis, CFA a man who needs no introduction in alternative lending market, who co-founded Debifo and succesfully merged it with Factris and later exited, active investor in private markets and a person I know for 10 years is joining Nter Alternative Lenders and Fintech fund as a fund partner. Justas himself went through all steps and stages a lending company should pass, financed 700 M EUR and helped to finamce 1500 SMEs from 5 countries. Besides fintech and alternative lenders fund we will work on international private debt opportunities. #nter #privateequity #privatedebt

We have a goal or target or lets call it just an ambition to become the best performing open ended private debt fund in our home market for 10 years in a row both compounded and in every single year. End of 2023 was our halfway. Our evergreen liquid private debt fund just celebrated its 5th Birthday and with a help of 250 investors to whom I am personally grateful, we relatively quickly became the largest private debt fund in Lithuania. Taking into account we raised just a modest 1.5 M EUR in our first close, former was far from granted looking retrospectively. Within 5 years we have made around 40 investments totaling ~100 M EUR in value financing plenty of M&A transactions, growth funding, real estate deals mostly in Baltics, with some deals in other EU countries. From laser technology to education, from industrial real estate to opening new Mcdondals and co-living projects in city centers. We have educated both companies and investors - private debt has nothing to do with lower credit quality nor higher interest rate necessarily means higher borrowing costs. 22 investments were already successfully closed, 55 M EUR are returned (principal + interest), actual average gross IRR of completed investment is ~15%, which was above our portfolio yield, meaning lots of premiums were collected along the way and will be potentially collected in the future. We have also faced some of so called “reality’s hits”, it stole (or temporarily froze) 1% of IRR, but it will make us better in the future. For A class investors who stayed in the fund from day 1, within 5 years the fund made 59% after all fees and provisions, in 2023 let alone 10,35% net IRR, and currently has a highest portfolio yield of ~14% from inception and some unrealized profit sharing arrangements, which might lead to good results in the 2024-2025 (previous results where reached with 12-13% portfolio yield). Our key strength is our team and interdisciplinary approach. Even though in a photo there’s only three of us (Donatas we are working together for 10+ years and Paulius, who will be working with us for the next 10 years) in reality we have 10+ people involved in running fund’s operations and helping fund with certain types of investments (Real Estate team is helping with RE debt, private equity team is helping with sector based insights, processes team is also on board). 

We are looking for a risk manager to join our wonderful team helping in super important aspects of our business. #hiring #nter

In recent years, crowdfunding financing has emerged as a substantial business model, experiencing an annual growth rate of nearly 100% in Lithuania over the past four years—effectively doubling in size annually (expected annual growth in EU/US 10-15% to 2030). This exponential growth trajectory naturally attracts a growing number of investors and projects, evolving beyond its origins as a tool primarily for small ventures into a viable option for medium-sized enterprises. The expanding market also draws in a significant influx of new crowdfunding operators (“grass is green” at the moment), with the recent EU-level licensing further encouraging exploration into this realm. Consequently, we witness the emergence of numerous platforms entering the fray, ready to kickstart their operations. However, it's essential to acknowledge that this market growth is far from solely driven by retail investors. Without exception, all platforms engage in a form of "manual brokerage," actively reaching out and presenting opportunities to high-net-worth investors. Notably (in LT), projects exceeding €1 million often secure only 20-50% of their funding from small-scale investors, with the lion's share—up to 80%—coming from larger financiers such as family offices or even private debt funds. On the flip side, it's crucial to address the less glamorous aspects of crowdfunding financing. The actual level of non-performing loans differs significantly from what's advertised, as it's relatively easy to mask. Platforms often fund not only the project itself but also interest payments, creating the illusion of timely obligations to investors while lacking the actual cash flow. Another complication arises with infrequent interest payments; an annual payment might maintain the appearance of project vitality throughout the year, despite potentially serious underlying issues, occurred when primary residential development market stalls. Furthermore, a notable practice is funding based on asset value rather than costs (LTV vs LTC). This can lead to situations where the loan-to-value ratio of 50% is effectively 80%, or declared 70% is effectively 85%. Add 12% annual interest and 4% platform fees borne by the borrower and you will be close to the water line. Investors should scrutinize the asset valuation process carefully, steering clear of investments presented with valuations involving terms like "conditional value," "future value," or "value consultation." A new trend worth noting is the financing of more complex projects—think aircraft projects, solar power plants, working capital, and beyond. Not to disparage these projects, but retail investors may not fully grasp the associated financial risks, much like many platform operators unless they hail from the respective industry.  #Crowdfunding #InvestmentInsights #FinancialTrends #nter

Spaudoje šiuo metu gana nemažai kalbama apie gynybos finansavimą privačių subjektų lėšomis, Nacionalinį stadioną, kainos indeksavimą – tai apipinama mitais ir raganų ieškoma visai ne ten, kur reikėtų. Dar blogiau, jog dalį komentarų, kurie atskleidžia bazinių principų nesupratimą, pateikia įvairių visuomenės grupių (tame tarpe ir valdžios) atstovai. Pradedant tokiais elementariais dalykais, kaip pinigų laiko vertė - pavyzdžiui, įmonė X pastatys mokyklą už 15 mln. Eur ir per 15 metų perduos savivaldybei, atgal gaudama 25 mln. Eur (15 metų lygiomis dalimis po 1,67 mln. Eur). Tokiu atveju galima bandyti sukurti skandalą (investuos 15 mln. Eur, o gaus 25 mln. EUR – t. y. „garantuotas“ 10 mln. Eur pelnas iš savivaldybės) arba paskaičiuoti ir suvokti finansinę realybę, jog šiame pavyzdyje būtų kalbama apie 7% metinę projekto grąžą. Jeigu manote, kad 7% yra daug, turite suvokti, jog tai eilinio komercinio nekilnojamojo turto nuomos pajamingumas Vilniuje ir tai yra pajamingumas, kurį galima uždirbti įdedant mažiau pastangų, negu vystant didelį infrastruktūros objektą. Tai pajamingumas, kurį galima viršyti tiesiog skolos rinkoje, skiriant dešimtis kartų mažiau resursų. Antras aspektas yra pasiruošimas konkursui ir išlaidos. Konkurso dalyvis ne tik turi investuoti į procesinius aspektus (formų, anketų, finansinių modelių, projektų ir kitų dokumentų regimą), skirti žmogiškuosius resursus keliems metams, bet dar svarbiau – turi pateikti komercinį pasiūlymą pastatyti statinius už iš anksto nustatytą kainą, nors statinio galutiniai sprendiniai nėra žinomi, ir dar prisiimti to riziką. Net ir laimėjus konkursą tarp galutinės kainos pasiūlymo pateikimo iki realios statybos darbų pradžios gali praeiti mažiausiai du metai (su sąlyga, kad antros vietos laimėtojas nepiktnaudžiauja ir nesikreipia į teismą tik tarp kitko), iš kurių didelė dalis yra būtent būsimo statinio derinimas su savivaldybės/valstybės institucijomis. Statybų darbų kainos kontroliuoti šiuo laikotarpiu nėra įmanoma. Atskirti koncesiją nuo labiau design and build tipo PPP taip pat reikia atskirti. Paprastai tariant – PPP atveju sukurtą infrastruktūrą viešas subjektas „išsilizinguoja“ iš privataus subjekto, šiam atliekant tik būtinąją objekto priežiūrą; koncesijos atveju – privatus subjektas pats turi operuoti infrastruktūrą ir gauti didžiąją dalį pajamų iš komercinės veiklos. Nereikėtų klaidingai įsivaizduoti, jog stadiono, krepšinio arenos operavimas „stand alone“ yra labai viliojantis verslas, kuris yra didžiosioms verslo grupėms „easy money“. Organizuoti Scorpions koncertus, popkornus, alų du kartus per savaitę su daug apyvartinio kapitalo ir mažu „upside“ yra veikiau galvos skausmas negu gyvenimo tikslas. Plačiau: https://lnkd.in/dMK3qxD6

I fully agree with a wake up call communication strategy regarding war, defense and deterrence, but the public communication regarding potential expansion of war in Ukraine, inevitable NATO war with Russia without a doubt affects not only international investors, but also local ones and this is especially a case in Baltic private markets. After all it’s mostly a medium and long term investments we are talking to, thus would you invest into: · type A communicating market (a country which cries over expenses of extra budget to build couple of schools or kindergartens for families of NATO allied troops? Countries that do not see a need for physical border protection, because its too old school, countries that lack urgency and are talking about 10 years taking projects or being reputationally afraid to step out of several conventions limiting use of certain weapons such as cluster munition if you know Russia would use chemical weapons easily against you); · type B communicating market (energy independent countries leading in green transition, with highest GDP share of defense spending; substantially increased their deterrence with new executed acquisition in military equipment and conscript reforms already in place, fully ready to welcome increased NATO presence). While I also understand type A communication might be sort of a strategy (to negotiate more financial support) and this might be used as a legal market manipulation (even a slight panic creates opportunities for buyers) I would focus on type B – strong actions makes strong messages to both our enemies and allies. Both buyers and sellers 😊  #privatemarkets #baltics