No explanation
In Parshat
Shemini, following the account of Nadav and Avihu,
the section dealing with dietary laws begins – “to distinguish
between the pure and the impure, between the living creatures that may be eaten
and the living creatures that may not be eaten.”1
The distinction between the permitted animals and the forbidden
animals raises a question that has occupied many commentators: What
distinguishes the permitted animals from all the prohibited ones? Why is a
hyrax worse than some other animal? What is wrong with camels and pigs? Why is
sturgeon caviar worse than salmon roe caviar?
This question is not a new one, and similar questions can be
asked regarding many other Torah laws. On this subject, however, the question
is glaringly conspicuous. One of the reasons for this is the prominence of
these laws in our daily lives and in halachah. Ever since we were exiled
from our land and thus unable to fulfill most of the Torah’s commandments, the
dietary laws form a central part of Jewish life. Separating milk and meat,
avoiding non-kosher foods, and using the appropriate silverware for each meal
take up much of our time and attention.
There have been various
attempts to resolve this question. Some have claimed that eating non-kosher
animals is physically harmful, and from time to time claims arise regarding the
danger of eating pork. It is true that pigs’ meat is sometimes infected with
worms, which can cause one who consumes the meat without sufficiently cooking
it to contract a parasitic disease called trichinosis. But if that were the
reason for the prohibition, instead of prohibiting pork the Torah could have
given much better advice – that one must cook the meat thoroughly
before eating it. Others have claimed that pigs are prohibited because they
were used for idolatry, while still others have claimed the reverse, that pigs
were not considered fit even for idolatry, so they are certainly unfit for our
consumption as well.
There have been similar
attempts to explain tzaraat, the leprosy-like condition described in
the Torah. Maimonides, for example, explained that tzaraat is a
type of disease. Ultimately, however, even he reached the conclusion that the tzaraat described in the Torah cannot be
identified with any of the diseases known to him. On the contrary, especially
in light of the fact that it can appear on houses as well as on flesh, tzaraat more
closely resembles a miracle than a disease. In fact, Rabbi Shneur Zalman of
Liadi writes that only supremely exalted individuals can be stricken with tzaraat, for only a spiritually exceptional person
is worthy of experiencing such a miracle on his flesh.2
The same is true regarding tumah
and taharah: no clear
explanations exist. We do not know why hedgehogs, chameleons, lizards, and
snails are tamei, while frogs are pure. There seems to be no
reason why a frog, which is pure whether alive or dead, should be considered
more exalted than a weasel or a mouse. However, the Torah distinguished between
them, and we have no logical explanation for it.
Generally, attempting to justify mitzvot by portraying them as
intended for physical or even spiritual benefit ultimately proves futile. This
does not mean that such a justification is necessarily unfounded, nor does it
mean that one should argue the reverse, namely, that pig meat is actually
better than cow meat, only that G‑d, knowing how good it is, nevertheless
prohibited it to us. What it means is that this type of justification can never
be the central consideration. It is better simply to rely on G‑d and not
attempt to give explanations.
Tamei and tahor
In the parshah, the words tamei and tahor appear in two completely different senses:
in the list of animals that may or may not be eaten,3 and
in the list of creatures that impart tuma when they
are dead.4
These two lists are juxtaposed, even though there is no practical connection
between them. Clearly, the statement, “it is impure for you,”5
regarding the camel and the hyrax has no relation – neither
conceptually nor halachically – to the statement “it shall remain
impure until evening; then it shall be pure”6
regarding the creeping things. The first statement denotes that the animal may
not be eaten, while the second denotes that these creatures convey tumah.
Animals that may not be eaten are not, as a result, tamei. When they are alive, they certainly are not
more liable to convey tumah; when they
are dead, some are more liable to convey tumah,
and some are less liable. For example, even though a snake may not be eaten, it
is one of the creatures that do not convey tumah,
neither when they are alive nor when they are dead.
Sometimes the two different senses of the terms tamei and tahor
intermingle in the text, as in: “To distinguish between the impure and the
pure, between the living creature that may be eaten and the living creature
that may not be eaten;”7 “Do
not eat them, for they are things that must be avoided…and do not make
yourselves impure through them, lest you become defiled through them.”8
Throughout the section, the laws of tumah
and tahara and the dietary laws are intertwined.
This mixture demonstrates, first of all, that any attempt to
explain these laws in a practical or rational way will prove extremely
challenging.
But it is important to stress that this mixture is intentional,
and signifies that although halachically and functionally the two concepts have
nothing in common, they nevertheless belong to one common idea. The terms tamei and tahor refer
neither to the cause of things nor to the way they work but to the distance
that must be kept from them. There are things that we avoid, and there are
things that we do not avoid, and the distancing of the tamei – in
all of the various senses of the term – is the subject of this
section.
Why was the Torah given?
In every generation and in every age, there are matters
that a person simply accepts, without expressing any objections or casting any
doubts. In Maimonides’ generation, for example, what was written in philosophy
books was sacrosanct. In our generation, by contrast, philosophical literature
causes no one to tremble, even philosophers themselves. To be considered a
cultured individual, it is sufficient to pepper some of these ideas into one’s
conversation, without needing to acknowledge them as the basis of the world’s
existence.
Our generation is a generation of psychology rather than philosophy.
Today, the study of the mind is what determines the essence of the human
experience in the world. No one claims today that one should avoid pork because
it causes intestinal worms, since all the mitzvot of the Torah can be explained
as spiritual dimensions, relating to the human personality. According to this
approach, the sole purpose of all mitzvot is to develop one’s personality, each
mitzvah in its own way.
In this context it is worth quoting Yeshayahu Leibowitz, who said
that the Torah was not given to mend the personality’s torn pants. There is an
element of truth in this. Whoever thinks that the exalted Torah was given so
that man could attain peace of mind, lead a happy family life, love his fellow
man, find favor in the eyes of society, or succeed in his affairs diminishes
the Torah greatly.
It is true that one who is steeped in the world of Torah
generally does not suffer corruption of character, but that is not the primary
purpose of the mitzvot. On the other hand, the Torah would never command us to
do something that clearly damages or destroys the body. The Midrash states,
“Nothing that is evil descends from above.”9 In
other words, no mitzvah would be given that causes damage, whether physically
or spiritually. That said, it is still quite a stretch to then pin everything
on this point and search for each mitzvah’s physical and personal benefit. G‑d
did not descend on Mount Sinai to provide information that can be found in a
cheap psychology textbook – to explain how to improve one’s life and
how to behave better.
The psychological explanations for mitzvot are even worse than
the medical explanations, which the Maharal criticized sharply, asking if it is
conceivable that the Torah amounts to an article in a medical journal.10 In
his time, at least, medical and psychological texts were expensive and
difficult to access. Nowadays, most of this information can be found easily,
for free, on the Internet. If this is the case, could it be that for that
purpose alone G‑d Himself descended from the heavens?
A kernel of truth
To try to interpret the laws of tumah
and taharah as
expedients for personal development diminishes the Torah’s glory. Moreover, one
must also remember something that is true of the Torah in its entirety, from
“In the beginning” to “before the eyes of all Israel.” Although no individual
can always uphold the truth, one must always remember that “the seal of The
Holy One, Blessed Be He, is truth,”11 and
it can never be forged. One explanation for this, in the name of the Kotzker
Rebbe, is that G‑d’s seal is truth because a seal must be something that cannot
be forged, and truth is the only thing that cannot be forged: The moment it is
forged, it ceases to be truth. It is possible to make forged peace, forged
wisdom, or forged beauty, but there cannot be forged truth.
To be sure, there are times and situations in which it is
impossible to appeal to truth. There are people who are not satisfied even when
they are given a true explanation, because they are stubborn and short-sighted.
Torah educators, from both earlier and later generations, have had to take this
into consideration. Often the bald truth is not as exciting as a brilliant
innovation, even if the latter idea may be faulty and questionable. Brilliant
theories may appear to be the absolute truth, even when they are actually
false. A person can live for twenty years on these falsehoods, satisfied with
the lure of their cleverness, and never bothering to seek the actual truth.
When someone sinks to psychological or medical explanations, he
need only peruse the section discussing the eight creeping
things – for once, human psychology has little to say. What is the
benefit of avoiding hedgehogs, chameleons, lizards, and snails? Why are the
weasel and the mouse worse than the cat and dog? Why is it that earlier in the
month of Nisan, this food is not harmful to one’s body or soul, whereas a few
days later, when the 14th of Nisan arrives, if one eats
it, one’s soul is cut off? Any attempt to impose artificial explanations on
these laws – explanations relating to physical health or mental
health – not only is problematic in itself but is a perversion of the
truth, and that is truly unforgivable.
Four entered the Pardes
The Talmud relates that “four entered the orchard (pardes). They were Ben Azzai, Ben Zoma, Acher
[Elisha b. Avuya], and Rabbi Akiva…Ben Azzai gazed and died…Ben Zoma gazed and
was stricken…Acher
gazed and became a heretic…Rabbi Akiva left in peace.”12
Maimonides explains that this “orchard” refers to the study of
other wisdoms and other disciplines,13 but
the Vilna Gaon sharply criticizes this explanation. He argues that besides the
fact that the explanation is fundamentally incorrect and constitutes an affront
to the G‑d of truth, it reduces the Torah to a mere antechamber leading to a
great hall, a preparatory stage leading to the study of the other branches of
knowledge. This interpretation sets as the highest level, as the goal,
something that is not worth pursuing.
Rav Hai Gaon says that “it is not our way to cover up [the true
meaning of] a matter and interpret it in a way that is not in accordance with
the intention of the one who said it, as others do.”14 When
we set out to interpret words of Torah, we try to explain them strictly in
keeping with the true intention of the one who spoke them.
This principle applies not only to methods of interpretation but
also as a way of life. Sometimes, for various reasons, people build
questionable, contrived explanations for the ideas in the Torah, reducing it to
an antechamber that leads to a wretched hall. When, after several generations,
a person finally understands that the glorious castle of his dreams is no more
than a hovel, he asks himself: Was it all worth it?
Maimonides indicates that the
lofty Pardes refers to Aristotle’s metaphysics. However,
several problems arise. First, this idea does not appear in the Torah at all.
Second, it fails to explain the mysteries of the Torah. Finally, and most
importantly, is it worth living and dying for this purpose? Is it for
Aristotle’s metaphysics that we sacrifice our entire lives?
And even if we argue that, in truth, whoever keeps the Torah and
the mitzvot will succeed in his business dealings, in his marital life, and in
his interpersonal relationships – still, is even this success worth
living and dying for?
This idea can be seen, in the extreme, in the narrative sequence
of the parshah.
The parshah
begins with the dedication of the Tabernacle, the fire that descends upon the
Altar and the terrible tragedy of the sons of Aaron. On the day of the great
revelation of the Shechina,
Aaron’s two sons died “when they drew near before God,”15 as
it says, “I will be sanctified through those near to Me; thus I will be honored
before the entire people.”16 And
what follows the revelation of G‑d’s presence and the great tragedy that befell
Aaron? What does the Torah offer as a reward? “These are the creatures that you
may eat from among all the animals that are upon the earth.”17 If
the Torah commands all this simply for the sake of a diet – whether
for the body or for the soul – then the dietary laws and their reward
are truly not worth the cost.
When approaching the Torah, there is no point in considering the
personal benefit to be gained, nor does one always find meaningful ideas. It is
therefore good to recall the words of the Kotzker Rebbe to a man who came to
him with questions about G‑d: “A G‑d who can be understood by anyone is not
worth serving.”
Footnotes
1.
Lev.
11:47.
2.
Likkutei Torah, Tazria 22b.
3.
Lev. 11:2–23.
4.
Lev.
11:24–46.
5.
Lev.
11:4.
6.
Lev.
11:32.
7.
Lev.
11:46.
8.
Lev.
11:42:43.
9.
Genesis
Rabbah 51:3.
10.
Tiferet Yisrael 8.
11.
Shabbat
55a.
12.
Chagiga
14b.
13.
Laws of the Foundations of the Torah 4:13; also
see Rema, Yoreh De’ah 246:4.
14.
Teshuvot HaGeonim 99.
15.
Lev.
16:1.
16.
Lev.
10:3.
17.
See
Rashi, Lev. 11:2.
By Adin Even-Israel (Steinsaltz)
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